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INTRODUCTION
Debates in legal philosophy tend to take place in rarified air, in-
volving highly theoretical and abstract arguments about conceptually 
possible legal systems, while rarely concerning themselves with the ac-
tual governments and legal systems that we mortals encounter here on 
earth.  Still, it can be helpful—both for the legal philosophers and the 
more general legal community—to drag these theoretical arguments 
down from the stratosphere and see how they can be adapted to de-
scribe and explain the workings of an actual legal system.  Through 
such an exercise, legal philosophers may “check their work,” so to 
speak, uncovering the flaws that become apparent when their theories 
are put through the rigors of reality, and practitioners can see how the 
underlying theoretical framework of the nature of law itself might 
help them to understand, and perhaps even improve, the functioning 
of their particular legal system. 
The positivist account1 of law provided by H.L.A. Hart in his semi-
nal work, The Concept of Law,2 provides an obvious choice for applica-
tion to an existing legal system.  It is no exaggeration to say that Hart’s 
work has set the context, terminology, and structure of the central 
debates in jurisprudence over the last fifty years.3  In addition, almost 
all of the most important contributions to legal philosophy over that 
period have been either rejections of Hart’s theory4 or attempts to re-
1 Positivism is a broad concept containing many variations on a theme, but it may 
be defined generally as “[t]he theory that legal rules are valid only because they are 
enacted by an existing political authority or accepted as binding in a given society, not 
because they are grounded in morality or in natural law.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
906 (7th ed. 1999).  The positivists attempt to explain the law in a value-neutral, em-
pirical manner, in an effort to divorce jurisprudential thought from what they perceive 
to be the limitations of natural law and its normative (or moral) explanations of the 
nature of law.  The central debate among contemporary positivists concerns the severity 
of this separation between law and morality, with some positivists arguing that certain 
laws may be valid because of their moral character, while others claim that law can al-
ways be identified by social practice without reference to morality.  See infra Section I.C. 
2 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994). 
3 See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Preface to HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POST-
SCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW, at v ( Jules Coleman ed., 2001) (“The Concept of Law is 
the most influential and important book in the analytic tradition of jurisprudence writ-
ten in the second half of the twentieth century.”).   
4 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, The Model 
of Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14 (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, The Model of 
Rules I]; RONALD DWORKIN, The Model of Rules II, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra,
at 46 [hereinafter DWORKIN, The Model of Rules II]; JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND 
NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
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fine, modify, or develop it.5  Hart’s most important contribution to le-
gal theory is arguably the introduction of the concept of “the rule of 
recognition”6—the ultimate criteria of legal validity in a given legal 
system—which fundamentally altered the longstanding clash between 
legal positivists and natural-law theorists about the nature of law.7  The 
rule of recognition is a complex idea, but it may be described most 
simply as the rule that is used to identify those other rules that are 
valid as law in a given legal system.8
To bring Hart’s theory outside of a purely theoretical debate, then, 
one must show how his understanding of law itself can provide an indi-
vidual in a given legal system with some articulation of that system’s 
rule of recognition; that is, it must provide the individual with a rule, 
whether complex or simple, that would allow that individual to de-
termine whether a given norm is or is not a law in that system.  There-
fore, for it to be practically useful, Hart’s concept of the rule of rec-
ognition should be applicable to an existing legal system.  In applying 
this theory to reality, one will hopefully be able, first, to uncover some 
of the strengths and weaknesses of Hart’s highly influential account of 
the nature of law, and, second, to provide the legal theorists of a given 
legal system with a better understanding of how their system works. 
Hart at least made a passing attempt to tether his theory to reality 
by suggesting, by way of example, that the rule of recognition for the 
United Kingdom is “what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law.”9
Whether or not this statement is an accurate description of that legal 
5 See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAG-
MATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY (2001); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW:
ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (1979). 
6 HART, supra note 2, at 94-110. 
7 This argument can be traced back through the history of political philosophy, 
with a list of important contributors that includes such luminaries as Plato, Aristotle, St. 
Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill. 
8 Hart himself explains that 
[t]he existence of . . . a rule of recognition may take any of a huge variety of 
forms, simple or complex.  It may, as in the early law of many societies, be no 
more than that an authoritative list or text of the rules is to be found in a writ-
ten document or carved on some public monument. . . . 
 In a developed legal system the rules of recognition are of course more 
complex; instead of identifying rules exclusively by reference to a text or list 
they do so by reference to some general characteristic possessed by the [valid] 
primary rules.  This may be the fact of their having been enacted by a specific 
body, or their long customary practice, or their relation to judicial decisions. 
HART, supra note 2, at 94-95. 
9 Id. at 107.
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system, it has proven much harder to provide a similarly succinct rule 
for the United States.  Due to the myriad complications inherent in 
the United States legal system,10 Hart’s supposedly simple positivist de-
scription of the law has proven quite difficult to apply.  In his famous 
and powerful critique of Hart’s theory, Ronald Dworkin asserts that 
the difficulties that arise when trying to apply the Hartian model to 
the United States demonstrate fatal flaws in the theory.11  In Dworkin’s 
view, because Hart’s positivist thesis fails to account for some of the 
most essential components of legal systems like America’s, positivism 
ultimately fails as an account of law in general.  If Hart’s theory is to 
have any practical effect for citizens of the United States, then, it must 
answer Dworkin’s criticism and account for those parts of the Ameri-
can legal system that Hart’s theory seemingly denies or ignores. 
A few theorists have attempted to formulate such a rule of recog-
nition for the United States.  This Comment will present and critique 
those previous accounts, ultimately building upon them to suggest a 
plausible American rule of recognition.  Part I focuses on Hart’s the-
ory, Dworkin’s criticism, and the response to that criticism by the so-
called “soft” or “inclusive” positivists.  Part II documents and evaluates 
previous attempts to provide a rule of recognition in the United 
States, beginning with the work of Kent Greenawalt and then moving 
to the more recent debate between Kenneth Einar Himma and Mat-
thew Kramer.  Finally, Part III presents my own account of the rule of 
recognition in the United States, and argues that an inclusive-positivist 
rule of recognition can be created for our legal system, but only if cer-
tain controversial empirical assumptions about the nature of law in 
the United States are correct.  Through the process of developing this 
rule, I uncover some of the deficiencies in Hart’s account of the na-
ture of law and present some possible solutions to the problems that 
these deficiencies present.  Furthermore, I explore how certain theo-
ries of American constitutional law—most importantly, theories in-
volving some form of popular constitutionalism—may prove to be in-
10 These complications include, as just a cursory summary, those involving consti-
tutional amendments, judicial review, the separation of powers both between the three 
branches of government and between the federal and state governments, and the 
question of constitutional interpretation, including the problematic idea of popular 
constitutionalism. 
11 See DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, supra note 4 (arguing that Hart’s theory of law 
fails to account adequately for features like judicial discretion in the United States); see 
also infra Section I.B. 
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compatible with a plausible positivist theory of law for the United 
States.
I. HART, DWORKIN, AND INCLUSIVE POSITIVISM:
THE DEBATE IN THE BACKGROUND
A.  Hart and the Rule of Recognition 
In 1961, H.L.A. Hart changed the context of modern jurispruden-
tial debate by introducing his concept of the rule of recognition and 
the corresponding positivist account of law.  Most importantly, Hart 
argued that law is a social fact and thus can be distinguished from mo-
rality.12  As opposed to moral norms, which are true regardless of so-
cial practice or acceptance, legal norms, according to Hart, are explic-
itly determined by social practice.13  Thus, Hart offered his own 
descriptive theory of law, derived from rules of conduct, where a rule 
is a “kind of complex social practice that consists of a general and 
regular pattern of behavior among some group of persons, together 
with a widely shared attitude within the group that this pattern is a 
common standard of conduct to which all members of the group are 
required to conform.”14
Hart distinguishes between two possible attitudes that can be 
taken toward such norms, which he calls the “internal” and “external” 
points of view.  If the individual is an observer of the norm but does 
not actually accept the norm as binding, that individual has an exter-
nal point of view.  If, on the other hand, an individual accepts the 
norm and uses it as her guide for conduct, then the individual can be 
said to have taken the internal point of view.  The internal point of 
12 The positivist attempt to explain law in a value-neutral, empirical manner may 
be summarized by John Austin’s statement that “[t]he existence of law is one thing; its 
merit or demerit is another.”  JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETER-
MINED 157 (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832).  One of 
Hart’s primary goals was, however, to further positivism’s descriptive aims by advancing 
past Austin’s limiting description of law as merely orders backed by threats issued from 
a habitually followed sovereign.  Hart argued that Austin’s account fails to describe cer-
tain fundamental and necessary varieties of law, such as the power to create obligations 
through contract and the continuity of law over time.  See HART, supra note 2, chs. 2-3.
13 Positivists describe this as the Social Fact Thesis, which “asserts that the exis-
tence of law is made possible by certain kinds of social fact.”  Kenneth Einar Himma, 
Inclusive Legal Positivism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSO-
PHY OF LAW 125, 125 ( Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).  This Part borrows 
heavily from Himma’s excellent and insightful summary of Hart’s theory. 
14 Stephen Perry, Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law:  Liberating the In-
ternal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171, 1171 (2006). 
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view is useful for determining when a social norm transforms into a 
“rule” and thus rises above the level of a mere convergent social 
habit.15  A social norm becomes a rule “when the general demand for 
conformity is insistent and the social pressure brought to bear upon 
those who deviate or threaten to deviate is great.”16  Thus, in Hart’s 
theory, a rule has both a behavioral element, with a convergent pattern 
of conduct, and a cognitive element, where participants develop a criti-
cal, reflective attitude toward the norm and criticize deviations from 
that norm by others in the community.17  This is often called the “con-
ventional” nature of Hart’s account, where “[r]ules are conventional 
social practices if the general conformity of a group to them is part of 
the reasons which its individual members have for acceptance.”18
According to Hart, every legal system has criteria by which it dis-
tinguishes legal rules from nonlegal norms.19  Hart describes these cri-
teria by first distinguishing between “primary rules,” or rules that re-
quire the participants of a legal system to do or abstain from doing 
certain actions, and secondary rules, which “provide that human be-
ings may by doing or saying certain things introduce new rules of the 
primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or in various ways deter-
mine their incidence or control their operations.”20  A legal system ad-
vances past a “primitive” state and becomes “fully developed” when it 
moves past primary rules to include secondary rules.21  The rule of 
15 Hart’s example of a social convention that does not rise to the level of law is the 
proposition that all Englishmen go to the cinema on Saturday nights.  Because no one 
would criticize the individual Englishman who stays home on Saturday night, the regu-
lar moviegoing practice is merely a convergent social habit and not a “rule.”  See HART,
supra note 2, at 9-10, 55-56.
16 Id. at 86. 
17 Kenneth Einar Himma, Making Sense of Constitutional Disagreement:  Legal Positiv-
ism, The Bill of Rights, and the Conventional Rule of Recognition in the United States, 4 J.L.
SOC’Y 149, 153 (2003). 
18 HART, supra note 2, at 255.  Positivists call this the Conventionality Thesis.  
Himma, supra note 13, at 125. 
19 Positivists call this idea the Differentiation Thesis, where, under Hart’s account, 
“[i]n every conceptually possible legal system S, there is a set of criteria CoV [criteria of 
validity] such that a norm n is a law in S at a particular time t if and only if n satisfies 
the criteria contained in CoV at t.”  Himma, supra note 17, at 151. 
20 HART, supra note 2, at 81. 
21 For Hart, a legal system is “primitive” if it consists of just a series of primary rules 
that assign duties and obligations to the citizenry.  This is because a society that issues 
only primary rules suffers from several deficiencies (Hart lists the main deficiencies as 
uncertainty, a static nature, and inefficiency in enforcement).  To make up for those 
deficiencies, the society must issue secondary rules.  These are of three types:  rules of 
change, which allow primary rules to be extinguished or modified; rules of adjudica-
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recognition, a special kind of secondary rule, provides the test for va-
lidity for all other rules, in that “[t]o say that a given rule is valid is to 
recognize it as passing all the tests provided by the rule of recogni-
tion.”22  Such a rule of recognition lies at the foundation of every 
“fully developed” legal system and thus is a necessary condition for the 
existence of a legal system.  In those systems, it is the ultimate or su-
preme rule of the system and is not subject to some other test for its 
own validity.23  Furthermore, the minimum conditions of a legal sys-
tem require, first, that those rules of behavior that are deemed valid 
by the rule of recognition be generally obeyed by the private citizens, 
and, second and most importantly, that the officials in society adopt 
the internal point of view with regard to this rule of recognition.  
Thus, the average citizen need only obey the rules through his or her 
actions, whereas the officials must hold the rule of recognition “as 
[the] common standard[] of official behaviour and appraise critically 
their own and each other’s deviations as lapses.”24  In summary, then, 
the rule of recognition is the secondary rule that is accepted and prac-
ticed by officials in a given legal system as the ultimate criterion of va-
lidity in that system.25
tion, which empower individuals to determine whether a primary rule has been bro-
ken; and, most importantly, the rule of recognition, which serves as an authoritative 
acknowledgment that the primary rules are the proper way of doing things.  A legal 
system that contains these three types of secondary rules is, in Hart’s view, “fully devel-
oped.” See id. at 91-99. 
22 Id. at 103.  Therefore, using the example supra note 15, the norm that all Eng-
lishmen go to the movies on Saturday is neither a valid law nor a legal rule because it 
was not enacted as law by the Queen in Parliament. 
23 In this way, then, the rule of recognition is a statement of fact about the legal 
system in question, but it is subject to two types of interpretation depending on the 
individual’s point of view:  the internal point of view (“It is the law that X”) and the 
external point of view (“In England, they recognize as law X”).  These points of view 
make the rule of recognition both a matter of law (for those who adopt the internal 
point of view) and a matter of fact (for those who adopt the external point of view). 
24 HART, supra note 2, at 117.  Matthew Adler stresses the importance of the “criti-
cal reflective attitude” of officials to the rule of recognition.  Matthew D. Adler, Popular 
Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition:  Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW.
U. L. REV. 719, 732 (2006).  Officials must not be merely obeying the rule but must ac-
tually accept it as “[a] social rule . . . [that] has determinate content only because there 
is behavior that some individuals engage in, taking as normative a particular standard 
(which they can grasp, if perhaps not exhaustively articulate) requiring that behavior.”  
Id. (footnote omitted).  This is also what positivists mean by the cognitive element of 
the Conventionality Thesis.  See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
25 It is identifying who, exactly, these officials are that creates some of the most seri-
ous difficulties in determining the content of the rule of recognition in the United States. 
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Hart thus constructs a complex explanation of the nature of law 
without appealing to moral or normative explanations.  Laws, for 
Hart, are rules of behavior that require subjects and officials to behave 
according to certain socially determined standards.  Deviation from 
these standards is not “wrong” in a moral sense, especially when 
viewed from the external point of view.  This explanation gives Hart 
great latitude to recognize all sorts of social orderings as fully devel-
oped legal systems—laws must simply be valid according to the sys-
tem’s rule of recognition to be a law and are not subject to some fur-
ther, normative test of validity. 
B.  Dworkin’s Critique 
Hart draws a sharp distinction between morality and law, making 
clear that morality is not a necessary condition for law, and Dworkin 
launches the main thrust of his attack against this very proposition.  
Looking at the problem from the position of a judge in a legal system, 
Dworkin argues that Hart’s account breaks down in “hard” or difficult 
cases, where it is not clear what decision the positive law demands.  
According to Dworkin, Hart is left to argue that, in these instances, 
the law has “run out” and that judges must “make law” in these hard 
cases.  Neither judges nor the public, however, view the judge’s role as 
being so discretionary as to allow the judge to make law in hard cases.  
Instead, Dworkin asserts that the participants believe that judges are 
restricted by the law in these instances, but a law that is grounded in 
the very moral norms that Hart supposedly excludes.  Dworkin calls 
these moral norms with the force of law “principles.”26  Principles, he 
argues, are distinguished from rules in that they are never officially 
26 See DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, supra note 4, at 41-43 (“[T]here are at least 
some rules of law that are not binding because they are valid under standards laid 
down by a master rule but are binding—like a master rule—because they are accepted 
as binding by the community.”).  Dworkin’s favorite example of a principle is that “no 
man may profit from his own wrong.”  Id. at 25.  As an example of the role that princi-
ples play in adjudication, Dworkin often uses the courts’ reliance on this principle to 
countermand the positive law regarding wills in Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 
1889), which held that a son who murdered his father cannot benefit by inheritance 
laws that, read literally, would allow the son to inherit the majority of his father’s es-
tate. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 15-20; DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I,
supra note 4, at 23-45 (describing the centrality of principles in his critique of positiv-
ism).  Positivists have taken to calling this criticism of Hart’s account (namely, that 
Hart’s theory does not account for the role that principles play in cases like Riggs) the 
Original Problem.  See Himma, supra note 13, at 138 (attributing the origin of this con-
cept to theorists’ responses to Dworkin’s analysis of Riggs).
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incorporated into the legal system through any procedure established 
by a validity criterion (what Dworkin calls “pedigree”), but instead 
simply exist as law.  Additionally, unlike rules, which either apply fully 
or not at all, principles have “weight,” in that contrasting principles 
may be weighed against each other in hard cases.  The fact that a 
principle outweighs another principle in a given case does not reduce 
the subordinated principle’s effect elsewhere. 
Dworkin argues that what officials in a legal system (specifically 
judges in his argument) really do is practice a process of what he calls 
“constructive interpretation,” whereby they weigh the “preinterpretive 
data” (positive law and principles) to determine the best decision in a 
given case.  This best interpretation takes into account the twin con-
siderations of “fit” and “justification”—i.e., whether the decision suffi-
ciently “fits” with precedent and the other preinterpretive data of the 
system, and whether it is the morally best justified decision given con-
siderations of justice, fairness, and procedural due process.  Dworkin 
thus believes that this is a better picture of actual social practice than 
that provided by Hart, as judges attempt to interpret the law in the 
best possible light while still considering themselves bound at all times 
by the law, even when the positive law has “run out.” 
But Dworkin’s theory is not conventionalist.  It is explicitly both 
normative and interpretive—a judge is bound to make the best moral 
decision in a given case, regardless of the acceptance of that interpre-
tation by her fellow officials.27  However, that decision is necessarily 
constrained by the notion of fit, and that fit is determined by the pre-
sent interpretation of the relevant past events.28  For Dworkin, there-
fore, officials decide hard cases by constructively interpreting the law 
in a way that both best fits with the current interpretation of the rele-
vant precedent and is best morally justified. 
Dworkin’s main criticism of Hart, then, may be summarized as fol-
lows:  Hart, by ignoring the role that moral norms or principles play in 
judicial decision making, fails to provide an accurate account of how 
judges decide hard cases.  As a result, Hart’s model sees discretionary 
27 See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 256 (“Different judges will disagree 
about [the best interpretation] and will accordingly take different views of what the law 
of their community, properly understood, really is.”). 
28 See id. at 227; see also Adler, supra note 24, at 738-39 (“[G]enuine U.S. law at pre-
sent[, according to Dworkin,] is identified by a constructed rule of recognition that 
integrates considerations of straight moral justifiability with the present, preinterpre-
tive understanding of U.S. law shared by some groups of persons.”). 
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power where judges are actually and, more importantly, legally con-
strained by moral norms. 
C.  Inclusive Positivism:  The Positivist Answer to the Problem of Morality 
Dworkin’s criticism presents a very real problem for the explana-
tory power of the positivists’ theory.  One possible solution is to avoid 
the criticism altogether by arguing that Hart and Dworkin are really 
just talking past each other.  Hart explicitly states that his is a descrip-
tive model, an attempt to answer the sociological question, “What is 
law?”  The sociological positivist can argue that Dworkin, by contrast, 
offers a normative model, exploring the more complex, normative 
question, “What should law be?”  Because they are asking different 
questions, it is logical that they come to different answers. 
This response, however, is not compelling.  First, Dworkin argues 
that Hart’s account is flawed descriptively and normatively.  By failing 
to make a place for the role that moral norms necessarily play in judi-
cial decision making, Hart’s model fails to describe what Dworkin as-
serts to be a necessary feature of any system of law.  From Dworkin’s 
perspective, Hart’s model fails both sociologically and philosophically.  
Second, the inclusion of the internal point of view in Hart’s account 
requires at least some inquiry into how law’s normativity affects those 
who take the internal point of view in a given legal system.  In other 
words, to be at all useful to actual participants in a legal system, Hart’s 
account must at least show the committed participant where to look to 
identify the law in that system. 
Recognizing these problems, many positivists (including Hart29)
have attempted to answer Dworkin’s attack by explaining that moral 
norms, while not necessary for the existence of a legal system, may be 
included in the rule of recognition of a given legal system.  Such a 
view is called “soft positivism” or “inclusive positivism,”30 and most of 
29 Hart’s answer to Dworkin was posthumously published as the postscript to The 
Concept of Law. See H.L.A. HART, Postscript, in HART, supra note 2, at 238. 
30 Along with Hart, notable inclusive positivists include Jules Coleman, Wilfred 
Waluchow, and Matthew Kramer.  This position is contrasted with so-called “exclusive 
positivism,” a position held by such legal philosophers as Joseph Raz and Scott Shapiro.  
Exclusive positivists generally subscribe to the thesis that the existence of law can al-
ways be determined by social fact, without reference to moral norms.  This split 
amongst positivist theorists has important implications for any analysis of Hart’s rule of 
recognition and will be a guiding consideration for the remainder of this Comment.  
As this Comment, however, only touches upon those elements of the debate between 
exclusive and inclusive positivists that are directly relevant to issues before us, I will dis-
cuss them only as they arise. 
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its proponents hold to a thesis that says, approximately, that “there are 
conceptually possible legal systems in which the legality criteria ‘in-
corporate’ substantive moral norms in the following sense:  satisfac-
tion of those norms is a necessary or sufficient condition for a propo-
sition to count as law.”31  A strong form of this view would be that 
“morality can be a condition of legality:  that the legality of norms can 
sometimes depend on their substantive (moral) merits, not just their 
pedigree or social source.”32  Inclusive positivists, then, adhere to 
Hart’s argument that there is no necessary connection between law 
and morality, but they reject the stronger argument that there cannot 
be a connection between the two. 
Most inclusive positivists subscribe to some variation of the Incor-
poration Thesis, which holds that “there are conceptually possible le-
gal systems in which the validity criteria include substantive moral 
norms.”33  The Incorporation Thesis has two possible components, de-
scribing the two ways in which a norm’s validity could depend upon its 
moral content:  a sufficiency component and a necessity component.34
One possible articulation of the sufficiency component would be the 
following:  “[T]here are conceptually possible legal systems in which it 
is a sufficient condition for a norm to be legally valid that it repro-
duces the content of some moral principle.”35  Under this view, an 
unpromulgated norm may be law simply because of its moral content.  
This may be seen as a conformity relation—a norm is legally valid if it 
conforms to a moral norm contained within the rule of recognition.36
This argument is a direct response to Dworkin’s “Original Problem”:  
if the sufficiency component is true, then a norm such as “no man 
shall profit from his own wrong” may have legal validity—without 
needing to pass some test for pedigree—where a similar moral norm 
has been incorporated into a legal system’s rule of recognition.  Thus, 
some positivists37 have argued that “Dworkin’s criticism rests on a cari-
31 Kenneth Einar Himma, Final Authority to Bind with Moral Mistakes:  On the Ex-
planatory Potential of Inclusive Legal Positivism, 24 LAW & PHIL. 1, 1 (2005).  Himma calls 
this assertion the Incorporation Thesis. 
32 Jules L. Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference The-
sis, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT, supra note 3, at 99-100. 
33 See Himma, supra note 13, at 136 (providing a historical overview of the Incor-
poration Thesis). 
34 See id. at 136-41. 
35 Id. at 136. 
36 Id. at 136 n.21. 
37 See, e.g., David Lyons, Principles, Positivism, and Legal Theory, 87 YALE L.J. 415, 423-
24 (1977) (reviewing DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 4) (arguing that 
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cature” of Hart’s view of the rule of recognition, in that positivists are 
not required to hold that pedigree tests for legal validity necessarily 
“exclude[] tests of ‘content.’”38  Under this view, there are “no con-
straints on the content of a rule of recognition, [and] a rule of recog-
nition can incorporate validity criteria that make moral merit a suffi-
cient condition for legal validity.”39
The second possible component of the Incorporation Thesis is 
the necessity component.  One possible articulation of the necessity 
component would be that “there are conceptually possible legal sys-
tems in which it is a necessary condition for a norm to be legally valid 
that its content be consistent with some set of moral norms.”40  This 
component allows for moral norms to constrain promulgated law, in 
that a duly enacted law will not be valid if its content conflicts with 
some moral norm contained within the rule of recognition.  This is a 
consistency relation—a norm is legally valid if and only if it is consistent
with the moral content within the rule of recognition.41  Under this 
condition, a law that contradicts some part of the moral content of the 
rule of recognition will be invalid, even if it was adopted according to 
valid law-creating procedures.42  Thus, contra Dworkin, inclusive posi-
tivists hold to some form of the Incorporation Thesis, containing ei-
ther the sufficiency or necessity component (or both), which allows 
moral norms to be incorporated into the criteria of validity as (1) a 
constraint on legal validity and/or (2) a sufficient condition for legal 
validity. 
Dworkin, however, anticipated this solution and rejected it, argu-
ing that even an inclusive rule of recognition cannot aid an official or 
judge in determining how much weight a principle should have in a 
Dworkin’s critique depends upon a “fundamental misconception of legal positivism”); 
see also Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 146-47 
(1982) (arguing that Dworkin’s understanding of positivism is untenable). 
38 Himma, supra note 13, at 138-39 (quoting Lyons, supra note 37, at 423-24). 
39 Id. at 139.  “Hart is generally taken as accepting the Sufficiency Component [of 
the Incorporation Thesis, even though he] never clearly and unambiguously endorsed 
it.” Id.
40 Id. at 136. 
41 Id. at 136 n.21. 
42 Hart deals directly with constitutions (and the United States Constitution in par-
ticular) on this issue.  He writes, “[T]here is nothing in my book to suggest that the . . . 
criteria provided by the rule of recognition must be solely matters of pedigree; they may 
instead be substantive constraints on the content of legislation such as the Sixteenth or 
Nineteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.”  HART, supra note 29, at 
250.  This statement suggests that Hart believed that an inclusive-positivist rule of recog-
nition for the United States could be formulated, though he never attempted to do so. 
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given case.43  But, the inclusivists respond, there is nothing about the 
rule of recognition that requires it to provide a test that eliminates 
uncertainty as to what legally valid norms and principles require.  The 
inclusivists point to Hart’s concept of the “open texture” of law, which 
leaves room for uncertainty in applying the rule of recognition to de-
termine what the law requires in a given case.  As Hart notes, “how-
ever smoothly [the rule of recognition may] work over the great mass 
of ordinary cases, [it] will, at some point where [its] application is in 
question, prove indeterminate; [the rule] will have what has been 
termed an open texture.”44  Thus, according to Hart, Dworkin is incor-
rect in assuming that “any legal issue arising in any case could simply 
be solved by mere appeal to the criteria or tests provided by the 
rule.”45  In the inclusivist’s view, the rule of recognition specifically 
concerns validation conditions, wherein “a legal norm has the prop-
erty of validity because and only because it satisfies the criteria con-
tained in the rule of recognition,”46 and does not necessarily also set 
out identification conditions, as Dworkin assumes. 
Similarly, while there must not be disagreement among officials as 
to law ascertainment under the rule of recognition, the rule need not 
settle all questions of law application.  In fact, there may be significant 
disagreement amongst officials as to how the law applies in a given 
case.  According to inclusivists, Dworkin mistakenly assumes in his 
criticism of judicial discretion that a disagreement between judges and 
officials about the application of laws is also a disagreement about the 
ascertainment of the sources of law.  Of course, Dworkin is correct in 
observing that if a significant number of officials in a legal system dif-
fer about the sources of law, then, under Hart’s definition of the rule 
of recognition as a conventional social rule (the Conventionality The-
sis), there is a breakdown in the legal system.  But he fails to see that 
there are two conceivable types of disagreement about the rule of rec-
ognition:  “(1) disagreement about what standards constitute the rule 
of recognition; and (2) disagreement about what propositions satisfy 
43 DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, supra note 4, at 40 (“We argue for a particular 
principle by grappling with a whole set of shifting, developing and interacting stan-
dards . . . . We could not bolt all of these together into a single ‘rule’, even a complex 
one, and if we could the result would bear little relation to Hart’s picture of a rule of 
recognition . . . .”). 
44 HART, supra note 2, at 128. 
45 HART, supra note 29, at 258. 
46 Himma, supra note 13, at 143. 
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those standards.”47  As long as the controversy is not over the content 
of the rule itself (proposition (1)), but “over which norms satisfy the 
standards set forth in it”48 (proposition (2)), Hart’s account of the 
rule of recognition as a social rule is not threatened by the mere exis-
tence of official disagreement. 
Lastly, it is important to note that many inclusive positivists hold a 
strong form of the Conventionality Thesis, in which they view the rule 
of recognition not merely as conventional but also as duty imposing.  
Emphasizing Hart’s account of the internal point of view of officials as 
necessitating a critically reflective attitude, inclusive positivists like 
Jules Coleman argue that the rule of recognition is “most plausibly 
thought of as being a shared cooperative activity (SCA).”49  Himma 
explains, 
Coleman identifies three characteristic features of an SCA:  (1) each par-
ticipant in an SCA attempts to conform her behaviour to the behaviour 
of the other participants; (2) each participant is committed to the joint 
activity; and (3) each participant is committed to supporting the efforts 
of the other participants to play their appropriate roles within the joint 
activity.
50
Under the SCA account, officials are obligated to apply the rule of 
recognition in the “discharging [of] their official functions and . . . it 
is the rule of recognition that autonomously gives rise to this obliga-
tion.”51  The SCA account solves a problem posed by Hart’s weaker 
conventional account of the rule of recognition, in that Hart’s con-
ventional rule could not give rise to autonomous obligation, as mere 
convention does not obligate.  But, insofar as commitments induce 
the reliance of others and create justified expectations, they give rise 
to obligation.  Viewing the ultimate rule as an SCA allows for the rule 
47 Id. at 145. 
48 Coleman, supra note 37, at 156. 
49 See Himma, supra note 13, at 131.  For a discussion of SCAs generally, see Adler, 
supra note 24, at 750-65, Michael E. Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, 101 PHIL. REV.
327 (1992), and Scott J. Shapiro, Law, Plans and Practical Reasons, 8 LEGAL THEORY 387 
(2002).
50 Himma, supra note 13, at 131-32.  Different legal philosophers emphasize dif-
ferent elements of the SCA requirements.  For example, Shapiro drops the third com-
ponent (mutual support) in his account.  See Adler, supra note 24, at 751. 
51 Himma, supra note 13, at 132.  In addition, Himma argues that while officials 
may also be morally obligated to apply the rule of recognition, such an obligation 
would rely on the rule’s content.  Under the stronger version of the Conventionality 
Thesis, which includes SCAs, it is the rule of recognition itself that gives rise to the  
obligation.  Id.
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of recognition to have an autonomous obligating power over officials 
because each official has a joint commitment to the activity governed 
by the rule.  Thus, according to many proponents of inclusive positiv-
ism, the rule of recognition is supported by a Strong Conventionality 
Thesis that views the rule of recognition as a shared cooperative activ-
ity that autonomously obligates officials to apply the rule correctly. 
In summary, the inclusive positivists address Dworkin’s criticisms 
of Hart by showing that there is nothing in Hart’s account that pre-
cludes the incorporation of moral norms as either a necessary or suffi-
cient condition within the rule of recognition in a given legal system.  
Furthermore, they combine Hart’s account of the open texture of law 
with the distinction between law ascertainment and law application in 
order to address Dworkin’s concerns about rule indeterminacy and 
judicial discretion generally.  Arguably, the most effective inclusive-
positivist argument combines the Incorporation Thesis with a strong 
form of the Conventionality Thesis that includes an account of the 
rule of recognition as an SCA.  With such a view in mind, we can now 
turn to two previously proposed formulations of the rule of recogni-
tion in the United States, evaluating how well they take into account 
Dworkin’s criticisms and the inclusivist solutions. 
II. PREVIOUS ACCOUNTS OF THE U.S. RULE OF RECOGNITION:
GREENAWALT AND HIMMA
There have been surprisingly few genuine attempts to work out 
the contents of the rule of recognition in the United States.  This is 
partially due to the fact that jurisprudential philosophy tends to be 
performed at a highly abstract and removed level, and rarely involves 
a discussion of any particular legal system.52  Furthermore, it is ex-
tremely difficult to apply Hart’s supposedly simple rule to the United 
States.  With myriad complexities (e.g., how to account for state sover-
eignty, constitutional amendments, popular sovereignty, and judicial 
review and precedent), the idea that our legal system could be re-
duced to one simple rule seems prohibitively difficult.  Still, some 
have attempted to develop such a rule, and, in this Part, I will analyze 
two such attempts:  those of Kent Greenawalt and Kenneth Einar 
Himma.  By evaluating these two accounts, I hope to explore the 
complex nature that any formulation of a rule of recognition would 
52 Dworkin seems to be the exception to this rule, as he refers primarily to a spe-
cifically Anglo-American-type legal system. 
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have to take in the United States and build upon their insights to pro-
vide the foundation for my own rule. 
A.  Kent Greenawalt’s The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution
Kent Greenawalt made what may be the first attempt to develop “a 
fairly comprehensive account of how one might try to state a rule of 
recognition for someplace in this country.”53  Greenawalt’s formula-
tion and corresponding discussion provide an invaluable starting 
point by, first, showing how the complex interaction of different bod-
ies of officials, at both the federal and state level, needs to be recog-
nized in any serious American rule of recognition, and, second, show-
ing how certain portions of Hart’s theory will need to be “amplified” 
to apply to the United States without distortion.54  Greenawalt ulti-
mately makes three insights into Hart’s theory:  (1) the “relationship 
between the ‘ultimate rule [of recognition]’ and the ‘supreme crite-
rion [of legal validity]’ may vary from the one Hart supposes”; (2) the 
ultimate standards of the rule may be uncertain at any given time in a 
stable legal system, due to the interplay between acceptance by offi-
cials and derivation from higher norms; and (3) because of (or, at 
least, related to) the second insight, “the ultimate standards may shift 
unnoticed over time.”55  Furthermore, Greenawalt takes seriously such 
complications as the Amending Clause56 and state sovereignty, giving a 
plausible account of how they might be included in the U.S. rule of 
recognition.  With these insights, Greenawalt provides an excellent 
starting point for developing a U.S. rule of recognition, noting the ef-
fect of certain idiosyncratic qualities of the American legal system on 
Hart’s general theory and providing a helpful example of how one 
might deal with them. 
53 Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV.
621, 621-22 (1987). 
54 Id. at 622.  Many of these suggested “amplifications” are more fully developed by 
inclusive positivism as described supra Section I.C.  Greenawalt wrote his article almost 
immediately after the publication of Law’s Empire, and though he accurately highlights 
the fault lines in Hart’s argument that Dworkin’s criticism exposed, he was writing be-
fore Hart and the inclusive positivists had developed their reply.  His article thus exists 
in an intermediate zone in the development of the argument between the inclusive 
positivists and Dworkin, and this proves to be a major weakness.  See infra text accom-
panying notes 69-70. 
55 Greenawalt, supra note 53, at 622. 
56 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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First, Greenawalt notes that the relationship between the Amend-
ing Clause and the rest of the Constitution demonstrates how the “su-
preme criterion” and the “ultimate rule of recognition” may be dis-
tinct in a way that Hart had not anticipated, in that the supreme 
criterion may not necessarily be included in the ultimate rule.  For 
Hart, the rule of recognition “includes an account of a ‘supreme crite-
rion’ which is all or part of the ultimate rule.”57  Greenawalt’s argu-
ment here is complex and subtle, but simply put, he argues that the 
Amending Clause must be the supreme criterion for law in the United 
States because the “norms adopted according to it take precedence 
over norms adopted by any other procedure.”58  Thus, any amend-
ment added by this procedure is not part of the rule of recognition, 
because its validity is justified not by reference to the ultimate rule of 
recognition but by how the amendment comports with the Amending 
Clause.59  But, Greenawalt asks, is this supreme criterion necessarily 
part of the ultimate rule of recognition in the United States?  Using a 
rule of recognition that is comprised of the Ratification Clause,60
wherein the legal authority of the Constitution is established with ref-
erence to the Ratification Clause in the same way that amendments 
derive their validity in reference to the Amending Clause, Greenawalt 
notes that “the supreme criterion could derive its own authority from 
57 Greenawalt, supra note 53, at 625.  Defining the “supreme criterion,” Hart writes 
that
a criterion of legal validity or source of law is supreme if rules identified by 
reference to it are still recognized as rules of the system, even if they conflict 
with rules identified by reference to the other criteria, whereas rules identified 
by reference to the latter are not so recognized if they conflict with the rules 
identified by reference to the supreme criterion. 
HART, supra note 2, at 106. 
58 Greenawalt, supra note 53, at 632. 
59 Id. at 637.  Greenawalt notes two complications with regard to the Amending 
Clause being the supreme criterion.  First, the clause has an open texture in that some 
questions are not answered by it (for example, can an amendment declare itself to be 
unamendable?  Amend the Amendment Clause?  Do away with the entire Constitu-
tion?).  Id. at 632-33.  Second, as noted by Bruce Ackerman, there may be extra–Article 
V amendments that are validated by longstanding official acceptance (for example, the 
Civil War amendments, which arguably were not enacted by proper Article V proce-
dure) and thus the supreme criterion may need to be reformulated to take account of 
longstanding acceptance as a valid source of law.  Id. at 640-42; see also Bruce A. Ac-
kerman, The Storrs Lectures:  Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1065 (1984) 
(“A candid reappraisal of the use made of Article V by the victorious Republican Party 
in the aftermath of the Civil War will reveal a series of serious legal problems for any 
thoughtful formalist.”). 
60 U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
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enactment in accord with the ultimate rule of recognition rather than 
constituting a part of that rule.”61  While “[t]he amending clause 
would remain the supreme criterion because norms adopted accord-
ing to it would override other norms,” the supreme criterion itself 
would be valid in reference to the ultimate rule of recognition, not as a
part of that rule.62
Still, based on his second and third insights into Hart’s theory, 
Greenawalt does not believe that the current ultimate rule of recogni-
tion contains the Ratification Clause.  While, at the time of enactment, 
the Ratification Clause may have been the ultimate rule, the Constitu-
tion as viewed by officials today no longer “stand[s] in the same rela-
tion to the ratification clause as the amendments stand in relation to 
the amending clause.”63  Greenawalt notes three “salient and related 
differences” between the Amending and Ratification Clauses:  (1) “the 
ratification clause is a one-time-only matter”; (2) “the ratification 
clause had no [legal] status prior to the substance of what was to be 
ratified by it”; and (3) “[t]he ratification clause cannot be viewed 
apart from the substance of the Constitution” itself.64  In addition to 
these important distinctions, it is an empirical fact that officials in the 
United States do not look to the Ratification Clause as the test for le-
gal validity.  As Greenawalt writes, “[T]he legal authority of the rest of 
the original Constitution is established by its continued acceptance 
and . . . the original ratification procedure is no longer directly rele-
vant to tracing what counts as law.”65  Here, Greenawalt’s observation 
that the ultimate rule of recognition may shift imperceptibly over time 
demonstrates how longstanding acceptance may have changed the ul-
timate rule in the United States from the Ratification Clause to the 
contents of the Constitution itself. 
From these observations, Greenawalt formulates the rule of rec-
ognition with regard to the United States Constitution as follows:  
“Whatever the Constitution contains, the present legal authority of 
which does not depend on enactment by a procedure prescribed in 
the Constitution, is law.”66  This leads to what is, perhaps, Greenawalt’s 
greatest contribution to the discussion of the U.S. rule of recognition:  
the United States most likely has a hierarchical rule of recognition 
61 Greenawalt, supra note 53, at 644. 
62 Id.
63 Id. at 638-39. 
64 Id.
65 Id. at 640. 
66 Id. at 642. 
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that is not one single “rule,” but is comprised of a bundle of rules, 
each directed at different officials.  A complete rule for the United 
States must, to begin with, include an account of state governments 
and state constitutions, the powers of which are not derived from the 
Constitution or the acceptance of federal officials but are limited by 
both.67  Furthermore, Greenawalt recognizes that the ultimate rule 
must include the power of judicial precedent in statutory and consti-
tutional interpretation.68
However, Greenawalt’s account of these components of the ulti-
mate rule proves unsatisfying.  Greenawalt hedges his bet somewhere 
between Hart and Dworkin, providing vague rules where there should 
be crisp ones.69  It is here that the timing of his article proves prob-
lematic.  Written right after the publication of Law’s Empire but before 
the positivists had formulated a systematic response, Greenawalt does 
not make the important distinction between law ascertainment and 
law application and grants Dworkin more ground than necessary.  
While he correctly diagnoses the problems that Dworkin’s critiques 
present, he merely points the way to resolution.  The weaknesses in 
Greenawalt’s account become apparent through Himma’s formulation 
of a rule of recognition and Matthew Kramer’s subsequent critique of 
that formulation, both of which will be addressed more fully below.70
These weaknesses, though, do not undermine the considerable 
strengths of Greenawalt’s formulation of a rule of recognition for the 
United States.  Greenawalt rightly characterizes the United States rule 
of recognition as a hierarchical “bundle” of rules that necessarily in-
cludes state sovereignty and the principles of judicial review, interpre-
tation, and precedent.  Additionally, as discussed below, Greenawalt’s 
account of the ultimate rule with regard to the Federal Constitution 
requires little reformulation and, with some minor retooling, will be 
appropriated into my own rule.  Lastly, Greenawalt’s insights into the 
separability of the supreme criterion and the ultimate rule of recogni-
tion as well as the shifting nature of the ultimate rule itself provide 
helpful elaborations to Hart’s theory that are not provided by the 
general inclusive-positivist account.  Keeping these strengths in mind, 
then, we turn to Kenneth Einar Himma’s account to see what can be 
67 Id. at 645-47. 
68 Id. at 647-54. 
69 For example, Greenawalt’s rules on both constitutional and statutory interpreta-
tion begin with the evasive phrase, “On matters not clear from the text.”  Id. at 659. 
70 See infra Section II.B-C. 
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added to Greenawalt’s rule in hopes of further developing a truly 
comprehensive rule of recognition for the United States. 
B.  Kenneth Einar Himma’s U.S. Rule of Recognition 
The next substantial attempt to develop a rule of recognition for 
the United States came almost twenty years after the publication of 
Greenawalt’s article, with Kenneth Einar Himma formulating an 
American rule of recognition in a series of articles.71  Himma meant 
for his articles to serve as an attack on inclusive positivism in general.  
Because of this difference in focus, he omitted some of the more im-
portant elements of Greenawalt’s work, such as a consideration of the 
role of state sovereignty.  Instead, Himma mainly concentrates on the 
power of the judiciary (specifically the Supreme Court) to bind all 
other officials with its mistaken rulings (i.e., rulings in which the 
Court misinterprets or misapplies the moral norms incorporated into 
the Constitution).72  This power, Himma argues, demonstrates that 
the ultimate rule of recognition in the United States cannot be an in-
clusive-positivist rule.  This is because it is not the moral norms incor-
porated into the Constitution themselves that determine the legal va-
lidity of a given norm, but rather it is what the Supreme Court says 
those norms are.  As we will see, this argument is subject to several ob-
jections, both empirical and philosophical, that cause Himma’s ac-
count ultimately to fail as a comprehensive rule of recognition for the 
United States.73  Nevertheless, because Himma does present a thor-
ough and useful analysis of the areas where Greenawalt’s argument 
falls short—namely with regard to the effect of judicial discretion and 
the nature of judicial authority on the ultimate rule—it is worth care-
ful explication. 
Of the particular theses set out as positivism’s conceptual founda-
tions, the two most important to Himma’s argument here are the Dif-
ferentiation Thesis74 and the Conventionality Thesis.75  These theses 
contain both a behavioral element (i.e., Hart’s conventionality) and a 
71 Himma, supra note 17; Himma, supra note 31. 
72 See infra text accompanying notes 77-79. 
73 See infra Section II.C. 
74 “In every conceptually possible legal system S, there is a set of criteria CoV [crite-
ria of validity] such that a norm n is a law in S at a particular time t if and only if n satis-
fies the criteria contained in CoV at t.”  Himma, supra note 17, at 151. 
75 “[T]he criteria of validity in every conceptually possible legal system are deter-
mined by a conventional rule of recognition that governs the behavior of persons who 
function as officials.”  Id. at 153. 
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cognitive element (i.e., Hart’s internal point of view).  Himma also 
adds what he calls the Modeling Constraint, where “a correct descrip-
tion of the validity criteria in a legal system S must express those prop-
erties that, as a matter of observable empirical fact, officials collectively 
recognize as giving rise to legally valid norms they are obligated to en-
force.”76  Thus, one must study the behavior of officials to see what cri-
teria they actually use to determine the validity criteria of a given system.  
An adequate positivist statement of the validity criteria must model itself 
after those empirically observable methods actually used by officials to 
determine which norms will be recognized and treated as law. 
Himma argues that Greenawalt’s rule fails the Modeling-
Constraint test because he does not account for the nature of final au-
thority and therefore does not provide an accurate empirical account 
of how officials in the United States determine the validity of law.  For 
Himma, it is an empirical truth that, in a given legal system, some 
body must have final authority to decide contested issues of law.  This 
body, Himma argues, is almost always the courts.77  According to 
Himma, then, a court has the authority to create an obligation on the 
part of other officials in the legal system to apply and enforce its deci-
sions, an obligation that is presumptive unless some higher authority 
nullifies that decision.78  The highest court in a given legal system has 
final authority because no other authority can nullify its decisions.  In 
other words, a court with final authority over a decision obligates all 
other officials by that decision, and, “since there is no possibility of re-
versal, the obligation is final.”79  Furthermore, the court with final au-
thority obligates the other officials regardless of whether it has made 
the objectively “correct” decision in a given case—right or wrong, the 
court’s decision is binding and creates a real obligation.80  As Himma 
76 Id. at 158. 
77 See Himma, supra note 31, at 3 (“[T]his much . . . is largely unchallenged among 
legal theorists and academic lawyers:  in most developed legal systems like those in 
Britain, Canada, and the U.S., the courts are vested with final authority to decide sub-
stantive issues of law.”).  It should be noted that Greenawalt agrees up to a point.  See
Greenawalt, supra note 53, at 653 (making an initial assumption that “there is no doubt 
that courts are supposed to engage in substantive constitutional interpretation”).
78 See Himma, supra note 31, at 4 (“[I]f a court has authority to decide a particular 
issue, then its decision binds the other officials until an appeal to a higher agency over-
turns the court’s decision.”). 
79 Id. at 4-5. 
80 Id. at 5-6.  The binding effect is present whether we speak of the decision as be-
ing morally correct or legally correct, as “a court with final authority can legally bind 
other officials with a decision that is mistaken under a variety of standards that may 
include . . . both moral standards and legal standards.”  Id. at 5. 
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writes, “Insofar as a court has final authority to decide a substantive 
issue of law, it can legally bind the other officials in its jurisdiction, 
other things being equal, with either of two conflicting decisions on 
that issue.”81
Because there is no higher authority in the United States court 
system than the Supreme Court, Himma argues, the Supreme Court 
has the sort of final authority that he describes.  Himma acknowl-
edges, however, that this final authority is not without bounds, finding 
two constraints placed upon the Court. First, the Supreme Court’s au-
thority is bound by what Himma calls the Plausibility Constraint, 
wherein the Court’s decision must be “based on an interpretation of 
the Constitution that can rationally be grounded in the text.”82  But 
this restriction is not really confining for most practical purposes, as it 
“doesn’t amount to much in determining the outcome of validity cases” 
because the limit “operates to constrain the Court in justifying its deci-
sions in hard validity cases, but it does not operate to limit the outcomes
available to the Court.”83  It is the second constraint, which requires 
the Court to conform its decisions with the morally best interpretation 
of the Constitution, that has more practical effect than the first.  Un-
der this constraint, “[t]he Supreme Court is obligated to decide the 
validity of duly enacted norms according to what is, as an objective 
matter, the morally best interpretation of the Constitution.”84  If the 
Court makes no apparent effort to ground its judgment in the morally 
best interpretation, it is, according to Himma, an empirical truth that 
the decision will not be upheld by other officials.85  Thus, for Himma, 
81 Id.
82 Himma, supra note 17, at 167. 
83 Id. at 169-70. 
84 Id. at 183. 
85 Note that this does not mean that the Court must reach the objectively correct 
decision that reflects the morally best interpretation in a given case, or even in any 
case.  The Court must merely ground its decisions in an attempt to determine the 
morally best interpretation.  The Court’s discretion is constrained, but, because of the 
Conventionality Thesis, it is constrained only “by what the other officials are prepared 
to accept from the Court in the way of validity decisions.”  Id. at 166.  Depending on 
the actual legal system in question, there may be a wide variety of “interpretations” that 
are empirically accepted by officials.  In the United States, for example, officially ac-
cepted interpretations may run from textualist or originalist interpretations to broader 
nontextualist interpretations.  The official acceptance of a variety of interpretations 
strengthens the Court’s power to bind other officials with its moral mistakes, as long as 
those mistakes are grounded in one of the accepted interpretative methods.  This obser-
vation is one of the strengths of Himma’s account and, as will be explained below, helps 
eliminate one of the more vague and unsatisfying components of Greenawalt’s rule. 
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the ultimate rule of recognition in the United States is simply that “[a] 
duly enacted norm is legally valid if and only if it conforms to what the 
Supreme Court takes to be the morally best interpretation of the sub-
stantive protections of the Constitution.”86
C.  Objections to Himma’s Rule 
According to Himma, then, Greenawalt’s formulation of the ulti-
mate rule of recognition fails as an empirical account of the Court’s 
ability to make mistakes that still bind other officials.  Greenawalt con-
sidered Himma’s formulation, however, and rejected it: 
Since officials generally treat a constitution as saying what the highest 
judges say it says, the power of courts to make constitutional law by deci-
sions might initially be thought to be an aspect not only of the ultimate 
rule of recognition but also of the supreme criterion, that is, an aspect of 
the form of law that takes priority over all other forms of law. 
 That view would be mistaken, however.  Since new constitutional 
amendments can override judicial interpretations of the Constitution, 
the legal force of constitutional interpretations is not part of the su-
preme criterion of law.
87
Greenawalt’s anticipatory response points to one of two objections to 
Himma’s proposed rule of recognition:  the Supreme Court may not, 
as an empirical fact, have the final authority that Himma grants to it, 
because, for example, Congress, with the approval of the states, has 
86 Id. at 186.  Himma believes that this formulation, as the only plausible formula-
tion of the rule of recognition in the United States, or any legal system like it, signals 
the death knell for inclusive positivism.  See Himma, supra note 31, at 15, 38-39.
Himma makes a complicated argument, but essentially asserts that it is a practical and 
empirical truth that any plausible legal system cannot incorporate moral norms them-
selves into the rule of recognition, because those moral norms never apply in their to-
tality. Id. at 26-28. Instead, the rule of recognition will always be what the final author-
ity says that it is.  Id.  Thus, following Himma’s argument, moral principles are neither 
necessary nor sufficient to determine the correctness of a norm’s legal validity in any 
circumstance.  This is because “the necessary or sufficient condition will instead reside 
in the judgments of the Supreme Court.”  MATTHEW H. KRAMER, WHERE LAW AND 
MORALITY MEET 117 (2004).
 Kramer demonstrates the operation of Himma’s thesis as follows:  If the Court 
thinks that a legal enactment is consistent with some moral principal (P) the enact-
ment is legally valid regardless of whether or not it is objectively consistent with P.
Similarly, even if it is posited that the correctness of a norm (N) as a moral principle is 
a sufficient condition for the status of that norm as law in hard cases, the court with 
final authority has the power to reject N as law in hard cases and to invoke or apply 
some contrary norm.  Inappropriate invalidation of N as a legal norm would be deter-
minative of N’s legal status.  Id.
87 Greenawalt, supra note 53, at 653. 
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the power to reject the Court’s interpretation through constitutional 
amendment.88  While practically this is difficult to achieve due to the 
cumbersome nature of the amendment process, this does not change 
the fact that the power exists.  Thus, to test Himma’s thesis, we must 
determine who, if anyone, actually has final authority in the United 
States.  If it is not the Supreme Court, Himma’s formulation of the 
rule is empirically incorrect.  Additionally, Matthew Kramer offers the 
second objection by defending inclusive positivism from Himma’s at-
tack and thus providing a critique of Himma on a philosophical level.  
By taking what survives this dual critique of Himma’s rule and com-
bining it with the strengths of Greenawalt’s formulation, one can con-
struct a superior rule of recognition for the United States.
1.  Empirical Objections
What Himma takes to be the uncontroversial centerpiece of his 
theory—a sort of judicial sovereignty in the United States—is, in fact, 
one of the most controversial topics in constitutional theory.  While 
there is some evidence that the Court may view itself as having final 
authority in constitutional interpretation, as indicated by Justice 
Frankfurter’s opinion in Cooper v. Aaron,89 Cooper itself is controversial 
amongst constitutional scholars.90  A central problem in applying 
Hart’s theory of law to the United States, then, lies in the difficulty of 
identifying that group that acts as the “official” body (in Hart’s termi-
nology) or “recognitional community” within the system.91  It may 
be—as Himma suggests—the Supreme Court, but it could also be a 
number of other options:  for example, all governmental officials (as 
Hart believes92), a division between officials in different political 
88 The fact that the Court defers to Congress as to whether an amendment has 
been validly passed further reinforces the notion of constitutional amendment as a 
limitation on the Court’s final authority.  See Greenawalt, supra note 53, at 634-36 (“Ex-
actly what authority the political branches have in settling the validity of amendments 
is now far from clear, but the leading case on the amendment process indicates that, at 
least in respect to many issues, Congress makes the final decision whether an amend-
ment has been properly adopted.” (citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939))). 
89 358 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (asserting that the Su-
preme Court is “the tribunal specially charged with the duty of ascertaining and declar-
ing what is ‘the supreme Law of the Land’”). 
90 See Adler, supra note 24, at 724 (“Many scholars reject Cooper . . . .”). 
91 See id. at 726 (noting the varied options for defining the recognitional commu-
nity, including personhood, citizenship, territorial presence, or title). 
92 See HART, supra note 2, at 117.
2009] Rule of Recognition in the United States 1185
branches (as Greenawalt seems to suggest93), or perhaps even the 
people themselves (as posited by popular constitutionalists like Ac-
kerman94).  The questions then become which of these is the most ac-
curate empirical description of the current American legal system, 
and, if it is different from what Himma presents, what does that do to 
Himma’s theory? 
As explained in Part I, Hart (and positivism generally) holds that 
only the officials in a legal system are required to take the internal 
point of view toward a system’s rule of recognition, and thus it is offi-
cial practice alone that provides the foundations of a given legal sys-
tem.  Some positivists, like Joseph Raz and (as we have seen) Himma, 
go even farther and argue that it is not official practice generally, but 
judicial practice specifically, that provides this foundation.95  Such a 
view points to what constitutional theorists call judicial supremacy.96
But many other constitutional theorists take different views of how the 
American legal system actually works.97  Alternatives to judicial su-
premacy include popular constitutionalism (official responsiveness to 
popular elections in the form of “constitutional moments”),98 judicial 
deference on certain classes of constitutional issues,99 the sharing of 
93 See Greenawalt, supra note 53, at 634-36. 
94 See Ackerman, supra note 59, at 1017-18. 
95 See Adler, supra note 24, at 723.  Joseph Raz floats the possibility that there may 
be multiple rules of recognition in a given legal system.  See JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT 
OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 200 (2d ed. 1980) (“[There may be] various rules of recognition, 
each addressed to a different kind of official[].”).  Adler goes even farther, arguing 
that there may be multiple legitimate recognitional communities in a given legal sys-
tem.  Adler, supra note 24, at 746. 
96 See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional In-
terpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997) (defending the concept of judicial suprem-
acy in the United States). 
97 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 24, at 721-26 (highlighting the views of Kramer’s 
popular constitutionalism and Dworkin’s focus on social practices). 
98 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 59, at 1021-22 (describing constitutional politics, 
as opposed to normal politics, as a “form of political action . . . characterized by Pub-
lian appeals to the common good, ratified by a mobilized mass of American citizens 
expressing their assent through extraordinary institutional forms . . . during rare peri-
ods of heightened political consciousness [deemed ‘constitutional moments’]” (foot-
notes omitted)); see also Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword:  We 
the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 60-74 (2001) (arguing that popular constitutionalism 
was ingrained into the Constitution by the Framers). 
99 Examples of judicial deference include rational basis review of certain types of 
legislation and the political-question doctrine.  See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and 
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 143-52 (1893) 
(suggesting a clear-error approach to constitutional interpretation by the judiciary); see 
also Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure:  The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
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authority between branches (so-called departmentalism),100 complete 
deference to another branch (such as executive supremacy or, at least, 
executive review),101 or a wholesale rejection of judicial review102 (or 
abandonment of judicial review in certain specific constitutional ar-
eas, like the Bill of Rights103).  All of these views pose some sort of 
threat to Himma’s empirical assumption of judicial supremacy and 
deserve consideration. 
First, however, one must look at the above-suggested practices and 
determine which practices are descriptive—offering an empirical ac-
count of the actual practice in the United States—and which practices 
are prescriptive—offering accounts of how the American legal system 
should or ought to be.  For example, wholesale or even partial rejec-
tions of judicial review—such as those presented by Tushnet and Wal-
dron—are not meant to be empirical accounts of how the American 
legal system currently operates, but rather suggestions for how it could 
work better.  Nor does a theory of executive supremacy accurately de-
scribe current official practice in the United States.104  Ultimately, 
therefore, these theories do not challenge Himma’s strictly empirical 
observations.  Other theories, such as accounts of judicial deference 
or underenforcement, logically assume that the Court has the power 
to rule on restricted classes of issues but, for a variety of reasons, 
chooses not to.  In these cases, deference to other political actors is de-
termined by judges themselves, and, therefore, such theories still as-
sume some level of judicial supremacy.  A judge may view her role as 
being constrained by some theory of deference or underenforcement, 
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213-20 (1978) (arguing that institutional constraints 
prevent the judiciary from fully enforcing certain constitutional norms). 
100 See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret?  The Quest for the Ultimate Constitu-
tional Interpreter, 48 REV. POL. 401, 417 (1986) (describing a “modified version of de-
partmentalism” that “ascribe[s] different areas of competence” to the various 
branches).
101 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 
905-11 (1989–90) (discussing the President’s power to review constitutional issues in a 
manner akin to judicial review); Michael Stokes Paulson, The Most Dangerous Branch:  
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 217 (1994) (arguing that “the 
President has coequal interpretive authority with the courts”). 
102 See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999) (denying all notions of singular supremacy within the three branches of gov-
ernment).
103 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE
L.J. 1346, 1348, 1380-82 (2006) (arguing that judicial review is countermajoritarian 
and should not extend to the Bill of Rights). 
104 See Murphy, supra note 100, at 420 n.28 (“No president has seriously pushed 
presidential supremacy.”). 
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but she is only restricted because she views her role as such—the ulti-
mate rule of recognition is still defined by judicial practice.105
Thus, only popular constitutionalism and true departmentalism 
(granting all United States officials some kind of final authority on 
constitutional interpretation) potentially pose a problem for Himma’s 
argument, as these accounts move the locus of final authority—either 
to different branches of the government or to the people themselves.  
As a preliminary matter, however, it is not clear that moving the locus 
of final authority changes Himma’s argument.  The nature of final au-
thority itself poses the problems explored by Himma.  If it is an em-
pirical truth that for a legal system to be effective and sustainable, 
some person or body of persons must have final authority over consti-
tutional interpretation, exactly who that body is will simply be a matter 
of observable official practice.106  As long as some person or body has 
final authority, Himma’s argument remains largely intact, even if the 
wording of his rule would need to be revised.107  Thus, theories like 
departmentalism, if true, would change the content of Himma’s rule, 
but would not affect the overall argument supporting that rule. 
Putting this preliminary matter aside, Himma’s empirical observa-
tion that in almost every case other officials (and the citizenry in gen-
eral) treat controversial Supreme Court determinations as binding law 
seems to be correct.  The common examples brought out to contra-
dict this observation (Lincoln’s refusal of the Supreme Court’s order 
to release a prisoner in the Merryman case108 and Roosevelt and the 
105 See Adler, supra note 24, at 725 (asserting that constitutional interpretation 
techniques are themselves determined by judicial practice). 
106 Adler provides the original argument that there is no single recognitional body 
in the United States, and that there are, in fact, any number of separate recognitional 
groups, each with its own rule of recognition.  Adler, supra note 24, at 746.  If true, this  
argument would pose a significant difficulty for Himma’s argument, as there would be 
no locus of final authority.  Empirically, however, it seems more accurate to say that 
the United States system is made up not of multiple, coequal groups, but, rather, of a 
series of hierarchical recognitional groups, as described by Greenawalt.  While groups 
lower down the hierarchy may have a limited authority in their sphere, their decisions 
remain subject to modification or even rejection by higher authorities.  Himma there-
fore seems to be more accurate in saying that most recognitional groups in the United 
States are under a liability, in a Hohfeldian sense, to have their legal situation changed 
by a group with higher authority, up until we reach the group with final authority. 
107 See KRAMER, supra note 86, at 115 (“[T]he key point arising from [Himma’s ar-
gument] is not the identity of the institution with the final say over the existence and 
contents of legal norms; rather, the key point is that some person or body of persons 
must have such a final say if a legal system is to be sustainable.”). 
108 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 152 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (hold-
ing that President Lincoln could not suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus). 
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New Deal legislature’s rebellion against the Supreme Court’s doctrine 
concerning the limits on federal power) are distinguishable from the 
general, proper operation of the United States legal system.  Lincoln’s 
actions took place during a severe governmental crisis and can be 
plausibly dismissed as an aberration attributable to the extremity of 
the circumstances.  And during the New Deal, the Supreme Court 
eventually acquiesced to congressional and presidential pressure, and 
those rulings ultimately established the post–New Deal limits on fed-
eral power.  One can plausibly argue that it was not until the Supreme 
Court itself changed its interpretation of the Constitution that the 
New Deal became valid law.  Pressure from the coequal branches of 
government certainly influenced the Court, but the Court itself de-
termined the validity of the law.  Some form of final authority residing 
in the Court, then, seems to be a necessary condition for the stability 
and effectiveness of American government.  The times when that au-
thority is difficult to locate or rejected by subordinate officials or citi-
zens do not define a legal system, but test it.  Challenges to the Court’s 
final authority, therefore, should be viewed as possible starting points 
of systemic breakdown, not cornerstones.  Thus, some form of judicial 
supremacy appears to be an empirical fact in the United States system 
of law when the system is working properly, as constitutional contro-
versies are settled by the Court in almost all cases, absent extraordi-
nary circumstances. 
However, going back to Greenawalt’s theory, judicial supremacy in 
the United States is not complete, as constitutional amendment—
either by proper Article V procedure or perhaps by longstanding offi-
cial acceptance—can override Supreme Court precedent.  Thus, the 
American rule of recognition should describe a “weak” form of judi-
cial supremacy that includes the possibility of amendment as a check 
on judicial authority. 
2.  Philosophical Objections 
Even if Himma is empirically correct (to a degree) about judicial 
sovereignty, it is not clear that his argument is philosophically correct.  
Matthew Kramer responds directly to Himma’s assault on inclusive 
positivism, arguing that Himma mischaracterizes the nature of the 
rule of recognition and its relation to courts in a legal system like that 
of the United States.109  Because his argument is a response to 
109 See generally KRAMER, supra note 86, at 103-40. 
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Himma’s broad attack on inclusive positivism itself, many of Kramer’s 
objections deal generally with inclusive positivism and are not ger-
mane to our narrower purposes.110  Kramer does, however, highlight 
two flaws in Himma’s argument that are useful for formulating a rule 
of recognition for the United States.  The first concerns the notions of 
duty and justification.  Kramer argues that the other officials use the 
same moral norms to justify their criticism of Supreme Court deci-
sions as the Court itself uses to determine the morally best interpreta-
tion of the Constitution.111  Because the two groups look to the same 
lodestar to justify their positions, it is that lodestar that provides the 
content of the rule of recognition, independently of what the Court 
says that content is.  Second, in line with Greenawalt’s formulation,112
Kramer argues that Himma overlooks the multiplicity and rankings of 
the criteria within any rule of recognition in a legal system as complex 
as the United States’s.113  While Supreme Court precedent can alter 
the meaning of substantive moral norms incorporated into the Consti-
tution, these norms still confer legal validity in all cases not affected 
directly by that precedent.  Thus, the interplay between Supreme 
Court decisions and the substantive moral norms in the Constitution 
is more complex than Himma presents, and the Supreme Court’s duty 
to adhere to those moral norms in hard cases is stronger than Himma 
suggests. 
Kramer argues that Himma first errs by mischaracterizing the duty 
and power of the Supreme Court.  When discussing the Supreme 
Court’s “authority” or “discretion” to bind other officials, Himma 
really means “the Court’s legal power to bind other officials with its er-
roneous law-ascertaining determinations.”114  The terms “‘authority’ 
and ‘discretion’ are at best misleading” because they imply that the 
Court’s power is combined with a legal liberty that the Court does not 
have.115  Kramer explains, 
110 For an example, see Kramer’s rejoinders concerning Himma’s implicit rule-
skepticism and the intension and extension of moral norms.  See id. at 119-26. 
111 Id. at 126-34. 
112 Note, however, that Kramer does not subscribe to Greenawalt’s proposed rule, 
and he in fact comes to the view of a hierarchical rule of recognition through his own 
line of argument.  See id. at 108-09 (critiquing Greenawalt’s position as “too frag-
mented a portrayal of the process of law-ascertainment”). 
113 Id. at 134-37. 
114 Id. at 126.  Kramer uses the term “power” in the Hohfeldian sense—i.e., the 
ability to effect changes in other people’s, and one’s own, legal liability.  Id. at 126-27. 
115 Id. at 127. 
1190 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1161
If someone is legally empowered to accomplish a certain alteration in le-
gal relations but is not legally at liberty to do so, then she does not have 
the discretion or authority to do so.  She can accomplish the alteration, 
but she may not; that is, she cannot permissibly accomplish it.
116
Himma, then, is incorrect in granting the Court liberty to bind other 
officials with its erroneous law-ascertaining determinations, as it is un-
der a duty to make its decisions according to the morally best interpre-
tation of the Constitution.  The Court breaches that duty when it is 
mistaken.  Thus, while the Court has the legal power to bind other of-
ficials with a mistaken ruling, it does not have the legal authority to 
obligate those officials to treat those mistaken rulings as legally de-
terminative.  Kramer sees the Court and the other officials as being 
engaged in a sort of SCA,117 where the Court has the power to alter 
the other official’s legal positions with incorrect judgments but is le-
gally obligated not to do so.118
Additionally, Kramer argues that because Himma bases the legal 
duty of courts on the proposition that they will receive official censure 
when their interpretations of the Constitution are incorrect, he ig-
nores the empirical truth that the Supreme Court meets with criticism 
in hard cases no matter what conclusion it reaches.  Thus, some group 
of officials will criticize the Court regardless of whether its decision is 
objectively correct or incorrect.  Consequently, Kramer finds an alter-
nate condition for the existence of the Court’s duty in the justificatory 
orientation of all official criticism:  “If officials converge in taking the 
abstract moral categories of the Constitution as their points of refer-
ence for applauding or deploring the law-ascertaining determinations 
of the Supreme Court, the Court is under a duty to apply those cate-
gories correctly when it passes judgment on the legal validity of 
norms.”119  The shared justificatory orientation of both officials and 
the Court on the same moral concepts settles the content of the 
Court’s duty, whether or not the Court correctly applies those moral 
concepts in hard cases.  These mistakes, then, are problems of law ap-
plication, rather than law ascertainment.  As Kramer states, the 
116 Id.
117 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.  Kramer does not employ the 
term SCA, but the duty he describes may be fairly characterized as such, as it meets all 
three requirements of that standard. 
118 See KRAMER, supra note 86, at 127 (distinguishing between legal power and legal 
authority in characterizing instances where incorrect Supreme Court decisions force 
other officials to treat mistakes as determinative). 
119 Id. at 129. 
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Court’s “missteps are errors of application rather than errors of selec-
tion concerning the precepts which they are inclined to invoke as 
binding upon [the Court].”120
Even though a judge can adhere to a shared rule of recognition 
while continually misidentifying the principles to be applied or apply-
ing incorrect principles in hard cases, Kramer does not deny that in-
correct decisions do create precedents that obligate all other officials 
in the United States.  According to Kramer, however, Himma over-
looks the “multiplicity and rankings of the criteria within any complex 
Rule of Recognition such as that in the American legal system.”121
While Himma is correct that whenever the Court rules on the validity 
of a given norm as law, its ruling settles the status of that norm, he 
“errs in thinking that the Supreme Court’s legal power to settle the 
status of norms as valid laws is incompatible with the emergence of 
norms as laws through other means,” such as an incorporationist cri-
terion.122  A Supreme Court decision binds only within the “preceden-
tial purview” of that decision, displacing a larger moral norm in the 
rule of recognition in only a piecemeal fashion.123  Misapplication, 
then, “displaces some moral precept that is optimal for addressing 
hard cases of some type, and substitutes for it an inferior precept 
which has thereby gained the status of a law for addressing the cases of 
that type.”124
But the incorporated moral criteria give way only in cases of con-
flict.  In all other respects, the unadulterated moral criteria continue 
as valid criteria for identifying law.  Furthermore, the shared justifica-
tory orientation of all United States officials preserves the criteria as 
valid even in the face of frequent misapplication.125  In summary, 
then, even in the case of mistaken applications, substantive moral cri-
120 Id. at 130.  Kramer discusses three notably anomalous or “odd” properties of 
the Court’s law-ascertaining duty.  First, the Court is undeniably empowered to pro-
duce results that it is duty-bound to avoid.  Second, the Supreme Court’s duty does not 
seem to be backed by any real force or threat of force, and it is thus a nominal obliga-
tion.  And, lastly, the sole means of backing up this nominal obligation is brought to 
bear on all decisions in hard cases, correctly or incorrectly decided.  Id. at 131-33. 
121 Id. at 134. 
122 Id.
123 See id. at 135 (noting that “[i]n a situation of multiple law-validating criteria 
that are ranked, the priority of one criterion over another does not result in the whole-
sale elimination of the latter”). 
124 Id. at 136. 
125 See id. at 136 (“Insofar (albeit only insofar) as that effect does not clash with 
anything ordained bysuperior criteria in the American Rule of Recognition, it abides.”). 
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teria incorporated into the United States Constitution will remain op-
erative and bestow legal validity on every moral principle that has not 
been set aside by specific Supreme Court precedent. 
Therefore, while Himma is correct that Supreme Court Justices 
are always under a duty to ground their decisions in the morally best 
interpretation of the Constitution, how they are required to make 
those decisions is determined not by their beliefs about the extensions 
of the moral criteria, but by the objective extensions themselves.126
And misapplication of those moral norms contained in the rule of 
recognition creates a limited precedent that only affects directly re-
lated cases.  Thus, the moral norm itself remains incorporated into 
the system’s ultimate rule. 
III. THE RULE OF RECOGNITION FOR THE UNITED STATES:
A PROPOSAL AND DEFENSE
Building on the strengths of the accounts provided by Greenawalt 
and Himma, and keeping in mind Kramer’s helpful critique of 
Himma’s proposal, I can formulate my own rule of recognition for the 
United States.  Borrowing Greenawalt’s structure, the inclusive-
positivist rule of recognition for the United States today, in hierarchi-
cal order, is approximately the following: 
(1)  All duly enacted norms that do not conflict with the ob-
jectively best interpretation of the appropriate part(s) of the 
Federal Constitution, which interpretation has not lost its le-
gal force and does not derive its present legal force from en-
actment by a proscribed constitutional procedure, are law; 
 (a)  the objectively best interpretation of the Federal Con-
stitution shall be determined by: 
  (i)  existing Supreme Court precedent, unless such 
precedent is rejected through proscribed constitutional 
amendment procedures; or 
  (ii)  the interpretation of any and all appropriate United 
States officials, administrative bodies, or lower-court 
judges if Supreme Court precedent does not apply or ex-
126 See id. at 140 (“[T]he officials engage in an Incorporationist practice that ab-
sorbs all genuine precepts of morality into the law regardless of whether those precepts 
have been discretely identified and designated as such.”). 
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isting Supreme Court precedent has lost legal force due 
to longstanding official practice. 
(2)  All norms that conform to the objectively best interpreta-
tion (as defined above) of the appropriate part(s) of the Fed-
eral Constitution, which interpretation has not lost its legal 
force and does not derive its present legal force from enact-
ment by a proscribed constitutional procedure, are law; 
unless: 
 (a)  such norms conflict with existing Supreme Court 
precedent that has not lost its legal force due to longstand-
ing official acceptance; or 
 (b)  such norms conflict with duly enacted norms as de-
scribed in (1). 
(3)  All duly enacted norms that do not conflict with the ob-
jectively best moral interpretation of those parts of the state 
constitution (or whatever was adopted in accordance with an 
accepted constitution-making procedure), which interpreta-
tion has not lost its legal force and does not derive its present 
legal force from enactment by a proscribed constitutional pro-
cedure, are law; 
 (a)  the objectively best moral interpretation of the state 
constitution (or whatever was adopted in accordance with 
an accepted constitution-making procedure) shall be de-
termined by: 
  (i)  existing precedent of the highest state court, not-
withstanding rejection of said precedent as enacted 
through proper constitutional-amendment procedures 
by the state legislature (or appropriate body); or 
  (ii)  the interpretation of any and all appropriate state 
officials or lower-court judges if precedent of the highest 
state court does not apply, or existing precedent of the 
highest state court has lost legal force due to longstand-
ing official practice. 
(4)  All norms that conform to the objectively best moral in-
terpretation (as defined above) of the appropriate part(s) of 
the state constitution, which interpretation has not lost its le-
gal force and does not derive its present legal force from en-
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actment by a proscribed constitutional procedure, are law; 
unless: 
 (a)  such norms conflict with existing precedent of the 
highest state court that has not lost its legal force due to 
longstanding official acceptance; or 
 (b)  such norms conflict with duly enacted norms as de-
scribed in (1). 
This rule grants the Court a strong power of judicial review, but 
not complete judicial supremacy, as it recognizes Congress’s power to 
reject a court’s ruling through constitutional amendment.  And while 
it is true that this rule seemingly places a great deal of power in the 
hands of the Court, it hews closest to the empirical truth that even 
controversial decisions by the Supreme Court are treated as law by 
United States officials and will be so treated unless explicitly overruled 
by the Court or nullified by constitutional amendment.127  The Court’s 
power is also curtailed by retaining Himma’s “original best moral in-
terpretation” language.  This language should be read as implying a 
strong form of the Conventionality Thesis, wherein all legal officials 
are presumed to participate in an SCA.  The Conventionality Thesis, 
and thus the original best moral interpretation language, carry a 
strong limitation on the Court’s power as described by Kramer. 
Furthermore, this rule goes a long way toward accounting for the 
inclusive positivists’ observations about the ways that a moral norm 
can be both necessary and sufficient to count as law in the United 
States.  Under this rule, a duly enacted norm will only be law if it does 
not conflict with the objectively best moral interpretation of the Con-
stitution and if consistency with the moral norms contained in the 
Constitution is a necessary condition of a norm’s legal validity.  Addi-
tionally, a norm has the status of law if it closely conforms to a norm 
contained in the Constitution, and thus conformity with a constitu-
127 Take, for example, the debate surrounding a controversial decision like Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  While many officials believe that the decision is mistaken, 
it is still held to be law.  See Himma, supra note 17, at 161 (adding that “[i]t is true, of 
course, that officials sometimes attempt to enact rules that restrict abortion in some 
way, but it is also true that they unfailingly obey the Supreme Court if it strikes down 
those rules as unconstitutional”).  Proponents of change either argue for the Court to 
overrule the decision or implore Congress to make a constitutional amendment in 
their favor.  Both options are taken into account within this formulation of the rule. 
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tional norm is a sufficient condition for legal validity.128  However, 
both tests for validity are subject to the interpretation of the Supreme 
Court, and should the Court err in identifying the correct norm in a 
given decision, that erroneous decision is binding down through the 
hierarchy. 
Lastly, the rule recognizes Greenawalt’s important observations 
regarding state sovereignty and retains the echoing structure that 
128 It may be asked what norms, exactly, will fit in the sufficiency category of my 
rule.  One possibility is Cass Sunstein’s account of the “canons of construction,” or 
those background principles that courts use when reviewing and interpreting statutes.  
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULA-
TORY STATE 147-59 (1990).  Sunstein defines canons as “reflecting background norms 
that help[] give meaning to statutory words or to resolve hard cases.”  Id. at 149.  These 
“interpretive principles” (borrowing Dworkin’s terminology), while never officially 
codified by the legislature or explicitly passed down through legal precedent, may be 
said to be “law” because they are applied by courts in the interpretation of statutes.  
Sunstein explains that these canons include, but are not limited to, principles that de-
rive “from policies that have a firm constitutional pedigree” that may thus be treated as 
a form of “‘constitutional common law’” that has “a kind of constitutional status.”  Id.
at 155 (citing Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword:  Constitu-
tional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1975)).  Sunstein gives as examples the prin-
ciple that “statutes enacted by Congress should not lightly be taken to preempt state 
law” and the rule of lenity in criminal law, which “counsels courts narrowly to construe 
criminal statutes in the event of vagueness or ambiguity,” a principle “rooted in [con-
stitutional] notions of due process.”  Id. at 156.  Thus, these canons may be said to con-
form to a constitutional norm (such as due process) such that they have legal validity 
without having been positively enacted as law. 
 Another example may be found in the Supreme Court’s state-sovereign-immunity 
jurisprudence, a constitutional principle (in the Dworkian sense) of which the Elev-
enth Amendment is simply one manifestation.  In cases establishing this principle, the 
Court has stated that 
the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, 
the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.  Rather, as the Constitution’s struc-
ture, its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, 
the States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty 
which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution. 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).  As the Court wrote, “The Eleventh 
Amendment confirmed, rather than established, sovereign immunity as a constitutional 
principle.”  Id. at 728-29 (emphasis added).  Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the 
principle that an unconsenting state may not be sued in its own court is law because it is 
consistent with a moral norm that underlies the Constitution’s structure and history, 
even though the moral norm is not articulated in the Constitution itself.  See id. at 728 
(discussing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), and Hans v. Louisiana, 134 
U.S. 1 (1890), and stating that “[t]hese holdings reflect a settled doctrinal understand-
ing . . . that sovereign immunity derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from 
the structure of the original Constitution itself”).  The principle of state sovereign im-
munity, then, may be said to derive sufficient legal validity from its conformity with the 
structure of the Constitution itself. 
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Greenawalt included in his rule.  Retaining Greenawalt’s structure also 
meshes with Kramer’s notion of a hierarchical rule that allows for moral 
norms to retain their extension both before and after judicial interpre-
tation.  Thus, this rule combines the strengths of previous attempts at 
the American rule while, hopefully, eliminating their weaknesses. 
As explained in Section II.C.1 above, many constitutional theorists 
reject the notion of judicial supremacy that my rule assumes.  This 
rule will especially bother popular constitutionalists, as it holds almost 
no room for popular sovereignty (with just the limited role afforded 
to the citizenry through the Amending Clause).  This conflict may be 
unavoidable, as the idea of a rule of recognition and the theory of 
popular constitutionalism may necessarily be at odds.  Hart’s rule re-
quires the existence of officials who are distinct from the general citi-
zenry.129  In a few places, Hart indicates that, in a democracy, the offi-
cial body may, indeed, be the populace at large, but, as this Comment 
demonstrates, Hart’s notion of an ultimate rule seems to require some 
sort of final authority to settle controversy and provide finality to de-
bates over what the law is.  It is difficult (perhaps even impossible) to 
place such final authority in the hands of the entire citizenry.  Hart’s 
theory, then, may simply be incompatible with the central tenet of 
popular constitutionalism, perhaps making it impossible to simulta-
neously hold an inclusive-positivist view of law and a popular-
constitutionalist view of the American legal system. 
Those concerned with a Court run amok, however, should not be 
alarmed by these conclusions.  First, under my formulation, the Court 
is checked by the process of constitutional amendment.  This process, 
albeit cumbersome and complex, allows the public, through Congress 
and the states, to reject any decision that they find truly outrageous.  
Furthermore, the Court is under a very real obligation to ground its 
decisions in the best objective interpretation of the Constitution.  
Should the Court fail in this obligation consistently, its authority will 
almost certainly come into question.  But this would be a moment of 
governmental breakdown, not the sign of a healthy legal system.  If 
such a moment of constitutional crisis occurs, the government of the 
United States itself would be under threat.  No formulation of a rule 
of recognition can, or should be expected to, account for such a crisis. 
129 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION
Applying Hart’s theoretical construct of the rule of recognition 
proves fruitful both to legal philosophy and constitutional theory.  
Building upon the empirical and philosophical observations of 
Greenawalt, Himma, and Kramer, supplemented by the theory of in-
clusive positivism generally, it is possible to provide at least a plausible 
description of the form that an inclusive-positivist rule of recognition 
must take in the United States today.  This rule shows how a real legal 
system can incorporate moral norms in the way described by inclusive 
positivists.  And the positivist account uncovers the inner workings of 
the American legal system, especially the role that final authority must 
play in any ordered legal system.  However, in applying theory to fact, 
serious issues are raised about the compatibility of a positivist legal 
philosophy with certain theories of American constitutional law, most 
importantly those theories involving any notion of popular constitu-
tionalism.  If the inclusive positivists are correct in their account of the 
nature of law itself and the rule proposed above (or something simi-
lar) is indeed the rule of recognition in the United States, the plausi-
bility of some of the oldest accounts of the nature of U.S. law may be 
on uncertain ground. 
